[the problems in the parable]

How is identity created, and how is cultural meaning produced? Do certain groups of people, certain genders, certain religions, have a greater affinity toward violence or nonviolence?

I believe the answer to that question is no -- at least not innately. However, circumstances, cultural training and indoctrination are creating generations of children who identify more with their particular community than as international human beings. And all over the world, children who don't have healthy adult role models are more likely to engage in unhealthy behaviors -- obese parents, relatives who smoke, teachers who shout and belittle, or family members who are violent or misogynistic.

Adult role models are not the only ways that children learn how to think. What about the Power Rangers? Snow White? Winnie the Pooh coloring books? Tomorrow's Pioneers? MTV shows? Stories, books, and images also play a highly formative role in creating the identities and attitudes of children.

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If a child is exposed to mainstream gender norms and narratives, in stories and in real life (i.e. Disney fairytales where the prince rescues the princess, where girls always wear pink and are told how 'pretty' they look, and boys never wear dresses but always play with trucks and roughhouse in a 'boys will be boys' fashion), these are the attitudes and behaviors they will replicate in their own lives.

Of course, children's books and shows are meant to teach a community's values to the next generation. But what if those values are barriers to an equal, just and peaceful world?

The "Sammy Spider" series of children's books target English-speaking Jewish children as its main audience. One book is called "Sammy Spider's Israel Fun Book," and it follows Sammy Spider's trip to Israel with his human friend, Josh.

Firstly, the right to inculcate your children with your own cultural heritage is important, true. But some of the images and words in this series are teaching Jewish children official Israeli state rhetoric, and painting an inaccurate picture of Israel's position in the Middle East. Not to mention preparing Jewish children for the adult role of continuing to support the status quo of Israeli superiority in the region.

Let children be children, you say? Children deserve honesty from the adults in their lives, and they also have a right to truthful, peaceful education about their background and their heritage.

One page says, "Sammy happily enjoys Tel Aviv with all its noise," with the following picture:

This picture is missing a few things. Aren't there some people who wear head scarves in Tel Aviv? Isn't there anyone, Israeli or Palestinian or otherwise, who doesn't look like a European caricature? Note the woman and child pair at the upper left, close to the two umbrellas -- they are gazing at a sleeveless summer dress in the storefront window.

Kids' books should be educational and accurate. There are some Muslims and some Arabs in Israel -- including the Arab Israeli citizens that the State of Israel so proudly claims as proof that apartheid is not occurring in Israel. "Israel" itself is a claim, and a disputed claim at that. It is disputed by most Palestinians and by many the international community.

The book mentions a kibbutz dining hall, and also describes Jerusalem as follows: "Jerusalem is a City of Gold/ Filled with treasures new and old." Young readers are subtly being taught that not only is Jerusalem a thrilling and historical place, but that it belongs to Israel -- no other perspective is presented.

The most troubling portion of this book, in my opinion, was the two-page full spread map.

To be fair, young children will probably not pay much attention to the particular borders and names on this map. However, this book was published in 2004, when the Road Map for Peace was being debated. There is a 'Gaza' on the above map, but there is no clear West Bank. Perhaps that curve in the road connecting the 'Dead Sea' to the 'Sea of Galilee' is meant to represent the West Bank. But this map makes it appear that all of the land depicted belongs to the State of Israel.

What are other ways in which identity is instilled in young people?

Jewish day camps and summer camps typically teach children Hebrew and read the Torah (in a similar way to Islam, where madrassas teach Arabic in order to recite the Qur'an). Jewish schools, however, usually display the Israeli flag and celebrate Israeli holidays and cultural attitudes.

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I aim to create a world where identity is inclusive. For example, children are taught that the words "I am Jewish" can have a variety of meanings, and that none of them are exclusive. Identity is hierarchical, with 'human being' at the top as the most important identity a person holds.

"I am Jewish" can mean born to a Jewish parent or with Jewish roots; culturally Jewish; religiously Jewish; socially and ethically responsible; a supporter of human rights; or dedicated to peace and justice. Jewish identity is individual - just like all other identity categories. Not all Jews support Israeli apartheid. Not all Arabs are Muslims, and not all Muslims are terrorists. In my opinion, identity is a spectrum, not composed of discrete categories.

It should also mean, I am one among many. It should mean that identities are layered. Instead of separating, exclusive labels, like Jewish or French or Baha'i or young or female, we need uniting identities.

The only identity that we have the right and responsibility to instill in our children is 'I am a human being', with responsibilities towards all other living things.

In times of need, when children (and later, adults) need to make decisions, they will return to their fundamental identity as a human being. They will not feel a particular need to protect their own community and attack other communities, even if this behavior does exist in the subtle nuances of their lower-level identity. Nationality, nationalism and patriotism are potent sources of energy in today's world -- we must be careful what we teach our children.

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If a middle ground between absolute commitment to the homeland (or the church, or add your 'ism' here) and a simple affinity for our origins and heritage can be found, then the past can be the past and the future can be the future, where we are all simply human beings.

Yes, it's idealistic. And yes, it's being done today, in communities around the world like Costa Rica's peace education system and Sweden's gender-neutral preschool.

Think about your teachers, parents, babysitters, and other adult role models.

What have they taught you about 'your community', about 'belonging', and about 'identity'?

[music and identity: south sudan]

South Sudan is preparing to become the newest nation in the world. What does mainstream thought tell us that a state needs? Boundaries on a map, a flag, a political and economic infrastructure, the creation of cultural meaning specific to this new nation, etc. In summary, an identity must be created.

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This is a great article on one aspect of that process in South Sudan: the creation of a national anthem.

Democratically selected as the result of a talent show, here are the lyrics of the national anthem of South Sudan, courtesy of the aforementioned article:

Oh God, We praise and glorify you for your grace on South Sudan, Land of great abundance. Uphold us united in peace and harmony. Oh motherland, We rise, raising flag with the guiding star And sing songs of freedom with joy For justice, liberty and prosperity shall for ever more, reign.

Oh great patriots, Let us stand up in silence and respect Saluting our martyrs Whose blood cemented our national foundation. We vow to protect our nation. Oh God, bless South Sudan.

[Egypt: the essence of the enterprise]

On January 25, 2011, on the heels of the Tunisian demonstrations, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians flooded the streets in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and Nile Delta cities in an astonishing show of solidarity against President Hosni Mubarak.

Within weeks, a large portion of the Middle East was in the midst of an anti-status quo, pro-democracy upheaval. Protesters in Egypt united across ideological lines in opposition to President Mubarak’s authoritarian regime and the stagnant Egyptian economy that has left millions of their ranks jobless.

Utilizing the power of social media and building on previously organized communities, youth and other revolutionaries organized weeks of almost entirely nonviolent protests without the overt support of established parties or clear leadership. In the time leading up to Mubarak’s departure, coalition-building was a efficient tool for powerful parties and vulnerable groups alike to unite under their common opposition to the regime.

But what comes next for Egyptians in a post-Mubarak Egypt has yet to be made clear. Perhaps the best place to start is by exploring the first few months of 2011.

The protesters in Tahrir Square and in other locations around Egypt in January 2011, though diverse and cross-sectarian, were composed primarily of urban, politically independent people with access to social media and connections with the urban labor rights movement. Impressively organized in terms of protest tactics and coordination, this heterogeneous population has been striving to form an entity capable of articulating its political and economic demands.

Should that entity be a political party? Several political parties? A non-governmental organization tasked with monitoring politics in a post-Mubarak Egypt? A business-oriented faction with union leanings? How will marginal populations, such as women and Coptic Christians, fit into this picture, and through which mechanisms will they articulate their needs as a community or simply as Egyptians?

A constitutional referendum on 19 March, in which “voters were asked to either accept or reject eight constitutional amendments as a whole – all of them designed to establish the foundations for coming elections,” saw 41% of 45 million eligible voters hit the polls.

Results indicated that 77% of voters favored the package, in accordance with mainstream Muslim Brotherhood opinion, and 23% stood with the revolutionaries and opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei in opposing the reforms contained therein. These reforms included term-limits for the president and a commission to draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election, among others.

Some voters who were opposed to the reform package voted no because they believe that “early elections would give extraordinary advantage to Mubarak’s old political party and the Muslim Brotherhood, which have strong organizational structures and would move to centralize power.” U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates echoed this concern and recommended that elections be delayed in order to give up-and-coming parties a chance to organize.

With parliamentary and presidential elections anticipated before the end of 2011, communities that were once more easily categorized but are now undergoing a shift in identity and aspiration (such as revolutionary, laborer, Muslim Brother, businessman) are being courted by both existing and developing parties.

Who participated in the demonstrations?

Acknowledging that “any direct association with the [Muslim] Brotherhood would discredit it in the eyes of many,” revolutionaries informed the Brotherhood of their plans and, “once it saw that the movement was succeeding, the Brotherhood joined in fully” on January 27th. In addition to labor issues, the April 6 Movement was also active on “support for bloggers being persecuted by the government … [and] ending sanctions on the Gaza Strip.”

Shortly after the protests began, many of these dissident parties came together under the umbrella of the Revolution Youth Coalition, with representatives "from the April 6 Youth movement, ElBaradei supporters..., two Muslim Brother[s], [two] from the Democratic Front Party and [two] from the Youth for Justice and Freedom."

The Coalition is not entirely representative of the plethora of opposition groups. Despite that, one coalition member, Ahmed Ezzat, expressed the hope that “it expands to include all the other young activists, including young members from the Karama party, Labor party, Kifaya and all others, including independent bloggers and Internet activists.”

Forming a single coalition like the Revolution Youth Coalition can reduce friction among parties with similar agendas and constituents and help diminish the chances of potential ‘cannibalization’. Forming an organized coalition can create credibility and legitimacy for the parties within the coalition by proving to Egyptians (and the world) that the youth are not only organized enough to revolt, but also organized enough to govern. A coalition of like-minded parties that fronts only a few main candidates is more likely to ensure that they are represented in government. Otherwise, constituent voters may split their votes, possibly denying these emerging parties a seat at the table. Emerging groups will need to establish a clear platform along well-defined ideological lines in order to clarify their position for voters and to differentiate themselves from other major parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

The coalition’s chief purpose has been to serve as a forum for opposition groups in order to “provide representation for the young who have played a role in political life in Egypt and have contributed to the current revolt” and to “articulate its demands and keep them at the forefront of public consciousness as Egypt prepares for change.” Those elementary demands have been the uniting factor for the heterogeneous groups belonging to the Coalition, including free and fair elections, the removal of President Mubarak, and the elimination of emergency law, although now that the President has stepped down, the Coalition had to reexamine its mandate. These groups will need to revise their strategies in a way that takes into account the absence of Mubarak but also the presence of the institutions and structures that he has left behind.

It is possible that the parties’ experiences within the Coalition have primed them for a nonviolent transition to democracy. Even if the parties within a coalition do not all agree on a common for-agenda besides an against-agenda, a coalition creates a space where these diverse factions interact regularly and are forced to discuss their ideas. Diversity and pluralism become the norm, and extreme ideas and tactics are subject to examination and become less acceptable. As anthropologist Talal Asad stated in a 2008 lecture on the Kifaya coalition,

"It is not that there is now a happy union of all these elements, but that an irreducible plurality persists as a foundation of political sensibility…However, this situation is not merely negative [oppositional]; it also provides a space of daily interaction and negotiation."

The Revolution Youth Coalition boasted representatives from a multiplicity of opposition groups, but it lacked well-defined leadership roles and figureheads. In the process of the demonstrations in January and February, this lack of clear leadership was an advantage that made it more difficult for the regime to negotiate with or target the opposition movement. In the post-Mubarak era, however, the parties’ transition into politics demands clear leadership. This could be an advantage for the recently formed groups in that the calcified leadership of the older ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood display a rigidity and structure that may not appeal to Egyptian voters in an upcoming election. In addition, the revolutionaries’ demonstrated ability to reach out to frustrated Egyptians in the course of the protests bodes well for their capacity to form a political entity that can connect with these supporters.

Substantial use of social media and virtual political activism aided the success of the January revolution, and built on a growing trend of youth engagement in digital political activism.

The expansion in usage of social media networks in concert with an enlarged (though not complete) freedom of the press within Egypt created a space for young Egyptians to carve out a political niche for themselves, outside of the confines of traditional identity lines and protected from the repercussions of declaring such an identity in the ‘real world’.

After Kifaya was founded in 2004 with immense support from the blogosphere, “the number of blogs [in 2005] had jumped from a handful to the hundreds and are now estimated in the thousands.” As a greater diversity of bloggers and Facebook users entered the scene, cross-community interaction allowed activists to find common ground in their opposition to President Mubarak despite their other ideological differences. "The blog and Facebook format, with its personal profile page, allows for individual bloggers to fashion a political persona that transcends the Islamist-versus-secular divide, allowing young women and men to write critically about hot political issues."

Regional and international powers have been consistently supportive of democracy in theory, but will find it necessary to readjust to a new democracy that takes Egypt and the Middle East away from the status quo of carefully negotiated treaties and economic structures that do not benefit the average citizen. The United States is providing more aid to Egypt, but the implicitly (and explicitly) attached strings are not a harbinger of genuine U.S. support for the Egyptian people.

Economic interests are also a significant aspect of the upcoming pre-election period. The established political and economic structures of Mubarak’s decades in power mutually reinforce each other. Professor Bassam Haddad explores this nexus between political and economic elites, coming to the conclusion that, “initially, it is the public sector, which explains the initial informal relations and networks that develop between state officials and businesspeople using the public sector as the cash cow or the golden goose.” Haddad continues,

“the more business actors can accomplish without state patronage, protection, facilitation, the more they can be independent and, depending on how political economies develop, this can lead to even more mutual interests between power and capital—because capital becomes power.”

Egyptian scholar Emad Shahin recommended that, at the very least, these revolutionary groups should “organize into pressure groups and operate at the grassroots level to monitor the government, participate in development-related projects and engage the population.” In fact, on 7 April 2011, the April 6 Movement announced its decision to, “instead, become a non-governmental organization advocating for civil liberties, democracy and human rights.” As an NGO, the April 6 Movement can certainly endorse particular candidates in the upcoming elections, but the organization’s wide-reaching networks and ‘revolutionary legitimacy’ may be better put to use as a monitoring and advocacy organization.

What's next?

A 41% turnout on the recent constitutional referendum may have broken records, but that number does not represent society-wide consensus among all classes of Egyptians. A get-out-the-vote campaign, undertaken by emerging parties and established parties alike, can educate the masses on new political platforms and ideologies before elections occur. Coalitions are perfectly situated for this endeavor, with wide-reaching social media networks, connections within the labor rights scene, and tried-and-true organizing techniques that have given them a degree of transparency and legitimacy not common among contemporary Egyptian parties.

Perhaps a Yalla Vote campaign is next? More demonstrations? Economic and political restructuring? One thing is for certain: the revolution is not complete.

Here are some great pics of some of the younger Egyptian demonstrators:

(the child's forehead says 'Egypt' in Arabic)

Do you think that the demonstrators used appropriate tactics of resistance? What should they do next to ensure their interests are represented in the upcoming elections?

[the profane in the holy land]

I've spent the last few weeks trying to gain a better understanding of what daily life in Palestine is like. From everything I've read thus far, it seems to me that the Palestinian experience and identity is shaped not only by a shared narrative and intense collective memory, but also by interactions with the 'Other'. In this way, Palestinians define themselves, but Israel, or opposition to Israel, also defines Palestine.

Israel claims a monopoly on legitimacy, politics, resources, morality, and international support. I recently stumbled upon an article with an accompanying video that I'd like to share: http://ht.ly/5eyth ("Israeli police wrestle US citizen to ground, put knee on his neck," from electronicintifada.net).

The video includes 19 year-old Lucas Koerner's explanation for his presence at the rally, and shows footage of at least three Israeli police roughly pushing Koerner to the ground and pinning him down beneath their knees as they handcuff and carry him to their vehicle.

(Lucas Koerner, from electronicintifada's article)

From what I can tell, the young man (American-Jewish) was being a nonviolent presence and standing in solidarity with the Palestinians at an Israeli settler rally on Jerusalem Day earlier this month. He had affixed a Palestinian flag to his kippah and another to his keffiyeh. The video showed the clear transition from surprise to confusion to anger at this seeming clash of symbols. As the young man stated on his blog,

"For them, Judaism and its physical symbol, the kippah, were inseparably bound up with the particular strain of ethno-religious nationalism associated with the state of Israel. It simply never occurred to them that a Jewish person would, in the name of Jewish ethics, stand in solidarity with the oppressed Palestinian people in their struggle for freedom. I feel that it was precisely this cognitive dissonance on a societal level that formed the motivation for my arrest."

I am interested in identity formation at the societal/communal level and how such an identity can aggravate conflict or set the stage for peace. Koerner mentions the conflation between national and religious symbols in mainstream Israeli identity. Israel is guilty of portraying Palestinians as hopelessly fused with Islam, fundamentalism, and terrorism. And it's not alone.

Not all Jews are Israelis, and not all Israelis are Jewish. Not all Palestinians are Muslim, and not all Muslims are Palestinian. It may sound ridiculous to state such obvious facts, but the way that we characterize, conceptualize, and use our language to frame a situation have great impact on how we perceive the participants, behavior, and possible solutions.

It's not about anti-Semitism. It's not about Arab terrorism. It's not as simple as Israelis versus Palestinians. Those categories are so much bigger and more complex than a single person, a community, a religion, or a state.

Next: Hamas and Fatah meet in Cairo.